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DIRECTORATE OF
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Central Intelligence Bulletin

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25X1

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25X1

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25X1

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Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

USSR - East Germany: Soviet troops in East Germany may be getting the Goa SAM system. (Page 6)

25X1

France: New military budget gives priority to strategic strike force. (Page 8)

25X1

25X1

USSR-Nigeria: Arms shipment (Page 10)

Brazil: Nuclear policy (Page 11)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010400060001-9

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010400060001-9

Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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*USSR - East Germany: Soviet troops in East Germany may be about to receive the SA-3 Goa surface-to-air missile (SAM) system.

The Goa is a low-altitude air defense weapon against aircraft flying at altitudes between about 1,000 and 50,000 feet. The maximum range is approximately 12 nautical miles. It has never been seen outside of the Soviet Union.

SA-3 deployment virtually stopped in 1965, with about 110 sites in the USSR--possibly because the Goa was little more effective than later variants of the widely deployed SA-2 Guideline SAM.

7 Oct 67

6

25X1

25X1

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France: The 1968 military budget submitted to the National Assembly reflects the continuing priority being given De Gaulle's strategic strike force.

The over-all military budget of 25 billion francs (\$5 billion) is five percent above that of 1967, while the six billion francs earmarked for the Force de Dissuasion represents an increase of about ten percent over this year's allocation. The military has been allotted about one-fifth of the total French budget.

For the third year in a row, capital expenditures--nearly one-half of which are for the nuclear forces--are to exceed operating expenditures. Over the next several years capital investment can be expected to continue to grow, after which operating expenditures needed to maintain the force should again start to catch up with investments.

The French strategic striking force will be composed of Mirage IV bombers and land-based and submarine-based IRBMs.

25X1

The land-based missiles are expected to be ready for their silos by 1969, and the first of the three Polaris-type submarines planned by the French is to become operational in about 1970.

25X1

7 Oct 67

8

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010400060001-9

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010400060001-9


25X1

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25X1

25X1



USSR-Nigeria: The first major sea shipment of Soviet military equipment to Nigeria under an arms agreement--probably concluded in July 1967--arrived on 4 October. [redacted] the cargo included vehicles and trailers; it may also have included self-propelled guns. [redacted] Soviet MIG fighters were airlifted into Nigeria in mid-August. The Soviets are also committed to deliver [redacted] patrol boats. [redacted]

25X1

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7 Oct 67

10

25X1

25X1

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Brazil: President Costa e Silva has told the National Security Council that nuclear policy will henceforth be handled by Minister of Mines and Energy Costa Cavalcanti, while the Foreign Ministry concerns itself only with the negotiation of "appropriate" treaties. The apparent attempt to control the foreign minister's grandstanding on this issue will not necessarily change Brazil's opposition to the draft nonproliferation treaty since he has ignored similar instructions before. Costa Cavalcanti himself has said that he does not believe Brazil should give up its right to develop peaceful nuclear explosive devices.

25X1

7 Oct 67

11

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